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Summary findings
Islam argues that externalities in financial markets,  not the relevant question. T he question is instead
implicit and explicit guarantees on financial transactions,  whether there is reason to expect a significant weakening
and information asymmetries in financial markets that  of the currency, possibly as a result of a change in policy
may exacerbate contagion provide a rationale for a  stance. Large real exchange rate appreciations have been
government role in managing the risk associated with  among the main reasons for runs on currency;
cross-border capital flows. Governments can  macroeconomic policy needs to be aimed at managing
complement private sector risk management with  these. With a fixed exchan-ge  rate regime, :3exibility  must
measures that help deal with the volatility of capital  be maintained elsewhere in the economy. Policymakers
flows. These measures include those that control the type  may need to make tradeoffs between price and output
and volume of capital flows and those that help investors  stability once market jitters have set in. There is no single
make better investment decisions and that may reduce  right answer to the question of which to emphasize more
herding behavior, such as better information provision.  at a given time; it depends on a country's circumstances.
The main instruments that have been tried or
recommended since the onset of the recent financial  Risk management in the financial sector
crises can be grouped in several categories.  The health of the financial sector is relatec. to the
government's  fiscal position, its macroeconomic policies,
Debt management  and financial crises. The regulatory and supervisory
The composition, maturity structure, and level of  frameworks in developing countries need t:o  be adapted
external debt have played an important role in financial  to the special features of these :narkets. Many developing
crises. High short-term debt relative to liquid assets has  countries are subject to frequert  trade and capital
been found to be consistently correlated with financial  account shocks while lacking the means to deal with
crises in recent times. Governments can affect the level  these shocks, such as adequate insurance markets. This
of debt (including private debt) and its composition,  situation may call for policies t.lat not only affect the
though the mix of policies they use will vary. Prudential  incentives of lenders but also hi;ep  manage risk more
regulation in the financial sector, corporate  sector  directly. Examples of such policies include maturity and
regulation, and restrictions on capital movements have  liquidity requirements.
all been used with varying success to change the level and
composition  of external debt.  Information and transparency
More disclosure of information and improvements in the
Other nmacroeconomic  policies  quality of that information could reduce the volatility
Most countries that have suffered macroeconomic crises  that arises from herding beiIav or. Ex ante, they may also
have had fixed exchange rate systems; some have not.  have a beneficial effect on the allocation of capital.
But whether or not a country has a fixed exchange rate is
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Regulations  permitting,  capital  can  flow in  and  out  of countries  at  great  speed  when
expected rates of return change. Expected rates of return depend on many factors both exogenous
and  endogenous  to  the  country  and  may  not  reflect  actual  returns  as  determined  by  the
fundamentals  within an economy. In a world  of more  open capital  markets,  improvements  in
technology  in  the  financial  sector and  reductions  in transactions  costs,  and  an  ever  smaller
proportion  of  cross  border  flows  coming  from  official  development  assistance,  volatile
expectations  will  more  swiftly be reflected  in large and  volatile  movements  in  capital across
borders. The changing international financial system in which large-institutional  investors hold
very  diversified portfolios  has also meant that  relatively small changes  in relative  returns  can
induce large (at least relative  to the size of emerging markets) portfolio shifts. Combined with
information  asymmetries, low transactions costs have also increased the attractiveness  of short
term investments.
Volatility in cross border capital flows can have serious costs. Large, capital movements
have led to banking and currency crises and recessions in many countries. A rich literature has
reviewed the causes of currency crises (Krugman,1979, Flood and Garber,1995, Calvo,  1993a,b,
1997,  1999 and Obstfeld,  1984). Currency crises are not a new phenomenon. But  as financial
markets have been liberalised, financial crises have become more frequent and have often been
associated with banking crises (Reinhart and Kaminsky,  1997). Empirical vvork (Kaminsky  and
Reinhart,  1966) indicates that that an incipient banking crisis helps to predict the probability of a
currency crisis.
The  recent  crises  highlight  the  externalities  associated  with  private  agents'  economic
decisions. With greater openness in capital markets and trade, a financial crisis in one country can
have more spillover or contagion effects. Further, economic agents within the country who were
not involved in borrowing  and lending decisions  have suffered unemployment  and (leclines in
their standard of living. The recessions induced by  capital flow volatility  can have  severe and
persistent  effects  on  future  growth.  Volatility  in capital  flows  can have  further  externalities:
during the bust period there are differential effects on economic agents. For example, while the
poor in rural areas who produce mostly for self consumption may be relatively better insulated
from macroeconomic shocks (such as those in Thailand or Indonesia), the poor or lower middle
2 Reinhart  and  Kaminsky  find that  the opposite  result,  namely  that a currency  crisis  helps predicl:  a banking
crisis is much weaker.
2income groups  in urban  areas are likely to be the most affected through employment  cuts  and
price changes.
While it has generally been accepted that resources should be reallocated so as to maximize
net  returns,  recent  experience  with  "twin"  (banking  and  currency)  financial  crises  have  led
policymakers  to  reassess  the  potential  net  benefits  from  maintaining  completely  free capital
movements across borders. Cross country evidence indicates that access to cross border capital
flows may not always improve average growth prospects over the medium term. (Rodrik, 1997.)
Financial liberalisation brings with it new risks. The issue is how to enjoy the benefits that greater
access to capita.1  brings while learning to manage the risks associated with financial liberalization.
Public policy plays a key role in risk management because of the externalities that  accompany
private agents' activities in financial markets and the existence of market distortions which may
result in suboptnmal allocations of financial resources. It is now widely accepted  that government
policies or lack thereof and have been at least partly responsible for the volatility in capital flows,
and that this  volatility has large  and undesirable consequences for countries in terms  of output
losses and unemployment.  Under such conditions, there is a case for government policies which
either seek to reduce volatility or to limit the potentially adverse consequences of volatility.  This
paper reviews the macroeconomic and financial policies that governments have implemented in
order to better rmanage  country vulnerability to volatility in capital flows. The paper is based on a
review  of the  existing  literature  and  analysis  of the  recent  financial  crises.  It  starts  with  an
introduction which  provides  a brief discussion of the  reasons for the observed trends  in cross
border  capital  flows.  The  next  section  provides  a  discussion  of  policies  to  improve  risk
management. The short conclusion highlights important lessons.
Explaining Cross Border Capital Flows
Capital  flows  into  countries  for  many  reasons.  There  is an  extensive  literature  which
evaluates the ermpirical  importance of "push" (exogenous) factors and "pull" factors in explaining
capital inflows to different regions of the world. For example, Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart,
(1993,  1994a,  1994b), conclude that  extemal  factors  are most important  in  explaining  capital
inflows to Latin America. Changes in interest rates in the United  States have been  among the
most  important  exogenous  (to  the  emerging  market)  factors  leading  investors  to  emerging
economies in search of higher returns. Other exogenous factors include terms of trade shocks, and
increases in international risk premia. Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi (1993) find that domestic
variables are ecqually  important in explaining bond and equity flows to Latin America  and more
important  in recent years in explaining such flows to Asia. Hernandez and  Rudolf (1995) find
3only domestic variables to be significant in explaining long term capital flows to a group of Asian
and  Latin American  countries. A  recent World Bank (1997) study and  Montiel  an(d  Reinhart
(1999)  conclude  that  domestic  policies  and  conditions  have  become  more  important  in
determining  the  direction  and  magnitude  of private  capital flows.  Economic  refonns  (a  pull
factor) boost capital inflows. Reforms which are perceived to be only temporary may also attract
capital inflows (Calvo,  1997). Investors would invest in the country temporarily in order to reap
profits while exiting before the policy change. Such actions can be destabilizing for the recipient
country: the case  for implementing policies which can be sustained in a world of open capital
flows, is strengthened. The recent crises have also highlighted the importance of elenments  other
than  the traditional economic  reforms, which have had an impact  either  on the magnitudes  of
cross  borders  flows,  their pricing  or on  their direction.  These are  state  implicit  and  explicit
guarantees,  transparency  and  the  disclosure  of information,  herding  behaviour  and  contagion
through financial market portfolio reshuffling.
Explicit and Implicit Guarantees
Perceptions of currency risk or the ability to protect the value of their investments, and of
default  risk  are  important  factors  that  affect  investors'  decisions  to  withdraw  fiom  assets
denominated  in certain currencies. Governments and international lenders of last resort  (ILLR),
through a host of explicit and implicit guarantees affect both by helping  to contain the risks of
investing in emerging economies. International and domestic policies affect the credibility and
perceived willingness  of governments (of both creditor and borrower countries)  to protect the
foreign  currency  value  of  investors'  portfolio, maintain  open  capital  accounts,  maintain  the
stability  of the domestic  financial system  and prevent  default, and to  maintain  equity  market
values,  among  other things.  Therefore, investors care  about the  host  government's  ability  to
maintain  its guarantees  or its net worth  (Dooley,  1996, and Krugman (1998))V,  as well  as the
creditworthiness  of the  individual borrower. Lender country  governments  can also  step  in  as
ILLR in order to reduce the risk of international systemic crises or for other economic or political
goals.  If for example, the United States government is expected to act as ILLR to an emerging
economy (such as Mexico), the risk associated with Mexican debt is significantly reduced and the
pricing and direction of capital flows will probably be affected. This means that creditors may
charge Mexico rates lower than they otherwise would have. However, the risk premiurm  will start
to rise  when  expectations  of a bailout are reduced. This may  happen  if the magnitude  of the
3Devaluations  affect  the net worth  of government.  A highly  indebted  government  which  has borrowed  in
foreign  exchange  but a large  part of whose assets  are denominated  in domestic  currency  may see
reductions  in net worth  after  a devaluation.  Expectations  of devaluation  which raise  interest:  rates for
government  also  affect net worth.
4needed funds is large (and therefore the costs of bailout are large). The failure of the IFIs to bail
out Russia in August 1998 and the recent attempts to bail in private creditors in Ukraine, Pakistan
and  Romania led to risk premiums increasing for many other emerging markets.
Creditors  can  be  expected  to  over-lend  to  risky  borrowers  in  the  presence  of
explicit/implicit guarantees (moral hazard). Capital will flow into countries at rates which do not
reflect the true (unguaranteed) cost of capital and therefore equilibrium borrowing at  any time
will be higher than would be the case under a situation without the guarantee. Lenders in creditor
countries will take on  more risky projects while borrowing financial  institutions  (protected by
their  own  guarantees)  will  take  on  riskier  projects.  But,  accumulation  of  (host  country)
government  liabilities (explicit/implicit  or contingent) at a rate  faster than  its accumulation of
assets will reduce net worth and reduce the value of guarantees4
Exogenous  shocks  (push  factors)  affect  net  worth  and  thereby  both  the  ability  and
willingness  of governments  to honour their  guarantees. For example,  for the  Latin  American
countries, in the  late  1980s and  early  1990s declines  in world  interest  rates had  two  effects:
investors looked for higher returns outside the developed world and declines in real interest rates
had the effect cf  reducing the value of existing debt  and increasing net worth  of governments
(Dooley,  1996).  In such a  context, close links between banking  and currency  crises  are  not
surprising.  As  contingent  liabilities  accumulate,  at  some  point,  investors  should  reassess
downwards  the  net  worth  of  government  and  the  willingness  of  governments  to  maintain
guarantees. 5 So:me (Bumside,  Eichenbaum,  and  Rebelo,  1998)  argue  for  example,  that  the
currency runs in Thailand and Korea occur after the information about high future deficits arrives
(due to weak banking sectors) but before the implementation of the new monetary policy. They
also argue that under fixed exchange rates and implicit guarantees, it can be optimal for firns  to
minimise  hedging  of  foreign  exchange  risks  (Burnside,  Eichenbaum,  Rebelo,  1999). These
theoretical and empirical analyses have highlighted the  interdependence of macroeconomic and
financial sector policies and outcomes.
4It  is also  true that  under imperfect  information,  if investors  have more  knowledge  of the government  debt
but less  of its assets  or the value of its assets,  then there  may unwarranted  change  in the perceptions  of
government  net worth.
5Small  changes  in the value  of net worth  may not have any effects  or significant  effects on investor
perceptions  since  investors  may only  change  expectations  if net worth  changes  are large  enough  or
alternatively  there may  be a minimum  threshold.
5Transparency and Provision of Information
It  is well  known  that  in the  presence of externalities there  will be an  under supply of
information by markets. Some contend that lack of transparency and poor disclosure requirements
may  affect  not only  the  direction and  volatility  of capital  flows  but also  their  pricing.  For
example, it is believed that  investors fled en masse from the East Asia region over an extended
period because they could not distinguish good borrowers from bad. Conversely others contend
that  lenders  may  have  "over  lent"  because  the  financial  situation  of  firms  and  financial
institutions  were  believed to  be better  than  they  actually  were. Maintaining  transparency  in
financial transactions has become increasingly important as financial markets have changed. The
increasing use  of securities instruments and equity markets rather than  bank lending,  growing
international  integration and the changing boundaries between institutions  has meantr a  greater
reliance  on  market  prices  in  the  allocation  of  risks,  putting  more  emphasis  on  the  public
disclosure  of  information  rather  than  on  bank-client  relationships(Stiglitz  and  Bhiattacharya,
1999). But there  are also situations in which the provision of better  informnation  could lead to
more  volatility  in the  sense  that  a  finer  division  of markets  and  prices  are  made  available.
However,  it may  be argued that there  are unlikely to be "surprises"  in these  situations so the
overall magnitude of changes in expectations might  be smaller. In most emerging  economies,
information tends to be scarce and these economies are more likely to be characterized as those in
which  greater information  could smooth volatility.  It may also be argued that implicit/ explicit
guarantees are more important for countries where information is scarce.
Hedging and Contagion through Portfolio Reshuffling
Emerging  market  economies  suffer  shocks  related  to  herding  behaviour  by  market
participants.  Investors seem to withdraw from financial markets in herds Such behaviour may be
rational  on  the  part  of  the  individual  investor  (for  example,  when  there  are  information
asymmetries, Calvo,  1997) but may be completely unrelated to fundamentals within a country7
Countries  may  also  suffer  shocks through trade  or financial links  with crisis  countries. Even
without such links, emerging market access to bank finance may be highly volatile because of the
way in which portfolio managers manage risks. The simple act of reshuffling portfolios  in order
6 Bannerjee,  A. (1992),  Kaminsky  and Schmuckler  (1999),  Kaminsky  and Reinhart  (I 999),  Holger  Wolf
(1999), for example.
7 For example if there are costs to obtaining information and if one investor is viewed as having superior
information on a country's economic prospects then his exit will be followed by others. Further, a
crisis in one country which may lead investors to revise expectations about anot!her  country which is
viewed as having similar fundamentals.
6to contain overall risk in response to a change in one country can have dramatic consequences in
another country.
What Might Be Said About Different Policy Options
Empirical analysis of financial crises have highlighted some factors  shared by countries
which have experienced capital flow reversals and financial crises: fast growth and liberalisation
of financial  markets,  perverse incentives  and  inability to  manage  risks  in  the  corporate  and
financial  sectors, large current account deficits and "overvalued"  or continuously  appreciating
exchange rates, high levels of debt, particularly short term external and domestic debt (especially
compared to levels of liquid assets), and sometimes, poor fiscal policy. Fast growth of financial
sectors, and  specifically  growth in banking sector credit  has led to  deteriorating  portfolios  in
financial institutions due to the inability of banks'  risk management systems and the supervisory
and regulatory framework to keep pace with financial system development. Poor performance in
the financial sector and the rapid buildup of contingent liabilities  have led to reduced  investor
confidence in the economy. Large current account deficits have meant a buildup of external debt
and  along  with  appreciating  real  exchange rates,  have  signaled  declining  competitiveness  in
export markets. High levels of short term debt and mismatches in asset/liability  denominations,
and fiscal deficits have led to fears of default and/or devaluation.
There are a wide variety of policies which have been applied in countries with the aim of
(a) limiting the growth of their domestic financial sectors, (b) restricting capital flows in order to
limit volumes as well as composition (c) improving risk management within banks and firms in
emerging  economies  and  enabling  easier  supervision  of financial  institutions  by  the  (limited
capacity) of the authorities,  (d) avoiding real effects on the domestic economy such as inflation,
(e) limiting implicit  guarantees and therefore moral hazard. The following  sections review the
different  policies that  countries have used  or may wish  to  implement  in order  to reduce  the
vulnerability of their economies to volatility in capital flows. There is no policy or no  menu of
policies which can prevent financial crises if a country is hit by a large enough shock. But there is
a growing  awareness that the process  of development and  financial liberalisation  changes  the
characteristics  of  risks  that  economies  are  exposed  to.  Governments  bear  responsibility  for
helping  economic agents manage risks better  and particularly, for implementing actions which
take into account the externalities associated with their actions.
There arn four principal categories of policies that policymakers can implement in order to
reduce vulnera 1Dility  to volatility in capital flows: (a) those that impose restrictions on inflows or
outflows of capital, (b) fiscal policies, (c) monetary and exchange rate policies, (d) financial
7sector and (e) corporate sector policies. Many of these policies are designed to counteract the
effects of (broadly speaking), government insurance which creates moral hazard, information
asymmetries and market failures. This paper will concentrate on policies designed to reduce the
incidence or severity of a potential crises, not those which may be taken in response to crises
(though in some cases there may be an overlap) 8.
Policies that Affect  Inflows  and Outflows of Capital
Many countries impose some restrictions on cross border capital flows. For some countries
these are used with the intention of blocking capital outflows, or simply to  increase monetary
autonomy under fixed exchange rates. Others use them to prevent overheating of the economy or
to change the maturity profile of their external debt. In this paper I assume that the objective of
governments  is to manage risk of large output fluctuations in a volatile world. Any controls on
capital  would  be  aimed  at  smoothing  short  run  fluctuations  in  output resulting  from  large
fluctuations  in  the  availability  of  financial capital.  In this  scenario,  the relevant  issue  is  not
whether  capital controls  are effective in preventing cross border flows  of capital  or in giving
monetary autonomy over the long term but rather, whether they might be effective as stabilizers.
The various types of capital account activities that may be restricted will not be covered here but
only those which have been widely debated in recent times as having possible stabilizing effects.
It  is generally accepted that  controls on inflows may  change the comnposition  of capital
flows, but that over the longer term they have little effect on the volume of capital since;  over time
evasion increases. 10 Changing the composition of flows is in itself a desirable outcome (see Box
1). Moreover, if capital controls have even temporary effects on total  flows (in other words they
temporarily  slow down inflows  in good times, and outflows in bad times)  then they  will have
acted as  smoothing mechanisms,  a desirable outcome. 1 1
8For example,  provision  of better  information  on corporate  and banking  accounts  will help investors  assess
the true risks  and perhaps  reduce  herding  behaviour  and it will also allow  creditors  to distinguish
between  good and  bad credits  in crisis  periods.
9See IMF:  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange  Restrictions  Annual  Report 1998.
0 For example,  Montiel  and Reinhart,  1999.
A recent  paper on Chile  (Schmidt-Hebbel  and Hernandez,  1999)  found  that capital  controls  in Chile
affected  the overall  level of capital  inflows  and interest  rates.
8Box 1:Types of Capital Inflows: are some better than others?
Both the empirical and theoretical literature has focused attention on the nature of capital
flows  and the maturity structure in determining crises. The hypothesis has been that short  term
debt  increases volatility as do portfolio flows  compared with longer term debt and FDI. Some
have  contendedl that distinguishing  between  capital flows  based  on  maturity  will  not  shelter
developing countries from  volatility in flows  since empirically it is hard to distinguish  between
short and long rerm  flows and between FDI and portfolios flows (Claessens, Dooley and Warner,
1995). Further, the development of derivatives markets (for example, FDI can take on properties
of more volatile debt since investors may short the currency in order to hedge their losses) and
special  loans  with bullet repayment clauses, makes this  distinction rather  useless from  policy
purposes  (Garber,  1996). However,  the  evidence from  the  recent  crises  and  the  theoretical
literature (Rodrik and  Velasco, 1999) indicate a significant role for  short term external debt  in
increasing  country  risk  and  indicate  that  in fact,  some flows  are  more  risky  than  others.12
Moreover,  they show  that countries  with large amounts of  short term debt  can  have serious
output losses in a crisis since the magnitude of transfers involved in a given period  is large.
A key issue is when such a tax should be introduced and whether such taxes should vary
with the situation persisting in global financial markets.  For example, should countries remove
reserve requirements on inflows when global financial conditions tighten, as Chile and Colombia
have done? Do:ing  so may encourage short term inflows but the removal of restrictions may help
reduce rates at  which domestic agents can borrow at a time when interest rates are high or rising.
If the restrictions are removed in response to what is perceived as a temporary change in market
conditions  in  order  to  reduce  the  real  effects  on  the  economy,  and  other  complementary
safeguards (for example, strong supervision of the financial sector is in place) such a policy may
be advisable. However, the risks remain that the temporariness of the market change is unknown,
and if the conditions persist, the country may accumulate large amounts of short  term debt. A
related question is at what point should countries without these controls impose them? Probably
not during tight liquidity conditions as this might (a) send the wrong signal to investors and (b)
further  reduce the supply of funds to the country. Policymakers need to weigh  the options and
take  complementary  measures  (see  below) to  reduce country exposure.  As the  experience  of
countries has shown, capital flows need not be very large in absolute terms or relative to GDP, in
order to be poorly allocated, or to create risk of crisis in countries.
12 It is revealing  that the total stock  of external  short  termn  debt is found  to be significant  in predicting
crises:  its significance  illustrates  the externality  associated  with  any individual  borrowing  abroad.
9There are many versions  of a tax on inflows: from a mild Tobin tax on all  international
financial transactions, to those which tax only short term borrowings and those which entail  a
reserve  requirement  on  all  (non-equity) or  certain types of  inflows.  Cotntry  experience  has
shown that small taxes do little to affect the direction and magnitude of capital flows. Also, taxes
and reserve requirements need to be broadly defined in order to work; those which  affect only
short term flows can be evaded by a simple matter of relabelling short term flows. This has been
demonstrated by the experiences of Chile and Columbia (see Box 2).
10Box 2: The Experiences of Chile and Colombia
Chile first  imposed a 20% nonremunerated reserve requirement whose holding period  was
differentiated ly  the maturity of the loan. For example it had to be held for  90 days for  90 day
credits but for  one year for  credits of maturity greater than one year in the currency in which the
debt was denominated. Several changes were made in order to close loopholes. For example, the
reserve requirement was later increased to 30%, and was extended to renewed borrowing, and to
foreign  currency deposits held in domestic banks, the maturity requirement was changed (there
was a one year  holding period for  all debt)  because of the difficulty of distinguishing  between
different maturities, the deposit was required to be made in dollars only,' 3 and secondary market
transactions in ADRs became subject to the requirement. 4 Most recently the reserve requirement
has  been  abolished  in  the face  of tightened  liquidity  conditions. 5 FDI  was  exempt from  the
controls  in  Chile.'6 Most  analysts  have concluded that  the  Chilean policy  was successful  in
changing  the  composition  of  capital  inflows  to  longer  maturity  inflows.  A  recent  paper
(Hernandez, Schmidt-Hebbel,  1999) finds  that these controls also lowered the total volume  of
inflows and had persistent  effects on the interest rate. 1' Columbia had a withholding requirement
on foreign  borrowing (non-remunerated cash reserves) declining with  the maturity  of the loan
(93%  for  loans under 12 months, 64% for  18 months, 50% for  24 months).At a later date, it was
changed  so  that the  requirement  was  140% for  loans  under  1 month,  and  42.8% for  those
between 59-60 months. These restrictions were found to have changed the composition of inflows
in favor  of more long term inflows. The extreme form  of controls on inflows is not allowing any
external  borrowing. Some  countries  have  allowed  only  "authorized"  institutions  to  borrow
abroad. This way external borrowing could be restricted to  "safe " institutions. 
18
13 In order  to prevent  the buildup  of open positions  in domestic  currency.
14 "Later  financial"  FDI  was no longer  exempt.
15 The Chileans  believe  such a relaxation  of the regulations  is rational  in that  the point  of the regulations
was to smooth  capital flows.
6 However,  FD] can also  have destabilizing  effects.  If foreign  investors  are locked in they may hedge  their
risks  by shorting  the domestic  currency  and may  therefore  contribute  to volatility  in flows.
17 The Chilean  authorities  believed  this too and that is why as inflow  volumnes  have  fallen,  they have
removed  th. controls.
18 However,  these institutions  could still  onlend  to "risky" financial  institutions  or corporations.
11Another  suggestion that  has recently been  espoused' 9 is that  countries  should return to
closed end mutual funds as the preferred alternative for foreign investment in domestic equities.
The advantage of these funds is that wholesale dumping of individual companies might be limited
or at  least  slowed down  considerably.  These funds used to  be the  preferred mechanism  for
investment in emerging markets.
Controls on capital outflows exist in many countries and more recently have been an issue
for  discussion  in  countries  which  had  previously  liberalized  their  capital  accounts.  In  such
countries  which  face  a  potentially  large  outflow,  such controls  may  be  used  to  slow  down
outflows, or may  enable the  authorities to have some control over monetary policy  in order to
limit the output effects of short run changes in capital flows. Like controls on inflows, those on
outflows are subject to leakages which may increase over time. However, studies have shown that
they  are effective  in the short run in reducing the rate of outflow as well  as in maintaining  an
interest rate differential for the host country.
Malaysia  stands  out  as  a  striking  example  of  a  country  which  imposed  controls  on
outflows. 20 The authorities  implemented these measures  in September  1998. These comprised
limits on investments abroad (prior approval being required), control of offshore markcets  in the
ringgit  (residents  were  previously  allowed  to  borrow  ringgit  from  nomnesident banks),  the
Malaysian currency (offshore banks had previously been allowed to lend in ringgit; proceeds of
these loans were being used to fund purchases of Malaysian assets for "speculative"  purposes),
and  all  ringgit earnings had to held in the domestic currency for a  year tntil  conversion was
allowed. There was concern in many circles that these actions would lead to a dramatic decline in
investor  confidence.  Others  felt  that  such  a move  enabled  Malaysia to  partially  insulate  the
economy from  excessive short run  volatility, whose negative consequences for  groNvth  would
have entailed a greater loss in investor confidence. Given the tightening in international  capital
markets that has persisted since this time, it is hard to attribute any change in access for Malaysia
to  the  implementation  of  capital  controls.  By  February  1999,  Malaysia  had  modified  its
quantitative  controls on capital to a price based system by adopting exit taxes.  For the stock of
capital which had  been  locked into the country in September  1998, a tax  rate of 30% on the
prinicipal  will be levied if repatriated  before end-March 1998, 20% before end-May and  10%
before end-August. For new portfolio inflows (after February  15) foreign portfolio investors will
incur a 30% tax for repatriation before 12 months and 10% after 12 months.
19  John Williamson  (1999).
12As a result of these measures, Malaysia has been able to pursue a more independent (and
expansionary) monetary policy and maintain an interest rate differential (at least in the short run)
at a time wheni its banking sector has been hard hit by tightened  liquidity conditions  in global
markets.  It has earned itself some breathing space during which time it can implement reforms in
the financial and corporate sectors.  These reforms will be key to future stability and regained
access to capital flows. The data available at the time of writing (data are only available with a
lag  of 3-4 months)  indicate  that  central  bank reserves  have  increased substantially  since  the
implementation of capital controls and that FDI flows have not declined. 2'  In terms of recovery
in output, Malaysia's  downturn began months later than those in Korea or Thailand and it already
seems to be on the way to having positive  growth in  1999. In May  1999 (8 months after the
imposition  of capital  controls),  Malaysia  plans to  sell as much  as US$2 billion  in  bonds to
international money managers.
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal  policy has  played an  important role in either  enhancing  country vulnerability  to
financial  crises  or, the  opposite,  in enhancing stability. Large  fiscal  deficits,  leading to  large
current accourt  deficits and real exchange rate appreciation, or financed by high levels of short
term debt are well known elements which affect a country's risk profile. But tight fiscal policy at
times of overheating in the economy, and good debt management has played an important role in
other countries. The interaction between fiscal and monetary policies has been widely discussed
in terms of exchange rate management. What has gained more attention in recent times  are the
strong interactions between capital flows and fiscal outcomes. Large capital inflows to countries
have  been  associated  with  periods  of  high  growth  (compared  to  the  recessions  induced  by
outflows)  and  therefore  buoyant  tax  revenues.  Most  countries  have  spent these  "additional"
revenues. Emerging markets'  fiscal policies tend to be procyclical. 22
Countries are increasingly recognising the value of using high revenues from good times to
set up the Treasury's own reserves (invested in foreign assets) in bad times. Estonia has recently
established  a  Stabilization  Reserve Fund  which has  aimed  to  do just  that.  The opportunities
20  Evidence  from countries  such as Chile in the 1990s,  Spain  in 1996,  FRY in 1990  indicate  that
liberalizing  outflows  may result in greater  inflows  (by increasing  investor  confidence).
21  Balance  of payments  data for Malaysia  are only  available  with  a lag so a detailed  account  of
developments  in external  accounts  is not available.  Unaudited  reserves  have increased  from US$21.4
billion  at end Sept. 1998  to US$28.6  billion  at end March  1999.  There  was a large  trade surplus  (US$
6 billion) (luring  Oct 1998-Jan,  1999.
22 See  Easterly,  Islam,  and Stiglitz  (1999).
13foregone from "saving"  a  portion of tax revenues (which will allow greater  flexibility  in bad
time) must be measured against the potential gains from stabilizing. Argentina, another country
with a currency board and therefore very few options in terms of alternative financing vihen times
are bad, also has such an arrangement. The argument for such a fund is strengthened by evidence
that the tax base tends to be procyclical in developing countries so that there is a larger surplus in
good times and a larger deficit in bad times. (Talvi and Vegh, 1999). But cotntries  need to factor
in the costs of holding high liquid reserves as they strive to achieve benefiits from large capital
inflows.
Government policy towards the placement of its deposits can be an additional  instrument
which may affect the stability of banking. In Estonia, for example, where government deposits in
the banking system are important (30% of deposits), movement in and out of banks can affect
individual banks'  liquidity since these deposits are treated  like any other deposits.  MDreover, if
governments run overdrafts (forced lending by banks)due to  unexpected tax revenue shortages,
or unexpected expenditures in bad times, this can create pressure for banks and enhance liquidity
constraints in bad times.
Many countries have exercised fiscal restraint as a key response to dealing with excessive
capital inflows. This was the case in Thailand in 1988-91, and Chile since the mid 1990s where
taxes where raised and expenditures moderated. Good fiscal fundamentals and fiscal management
were very important for Chile in dealing with an open capital account. Malaysia limlited public
consumption and downsized the public sector during the years of plenty.
Public debt management has turned out to be of critical importance. The recent crises have
shown that the build-up of short term domestic debt by  government (as well  as by  the private
sector) is an important factor affecting the ability of governments to maintain the status quo (even
if the total stock of debt may be relatively small). High levels of short term debt, high interest
payments  and poorly developed expenditure and taxation policy  leads to expectations  that the
government will (a) default on domestic debt obligations (which may be held by foreigners or by
banks funded with foreign borrowing) with consequences for banks and future access ta financing
(which in turn will have implications for macroeconomic policy) or will (b) monetise the deficit
(which could undermine  the exchange rate regime). Good fiscal management is key to avoiding
the  build-up  of short  term  debt,  domestic or external,  at high  interest rates  and  once having
accumulated short term debt, key to getting out of the debt trap.
Though country net worth is almost impossible to quantify and borrower solvency may be
hard to verify,  reductions  in net worth  (which may be easier to  establish., by  looking  at  debt
14accumulation  versus asset accumulation)  signal the direction of changes and also signal the
willingness  of governments  to service  debt since the relative costs of servicing  debt increase as
net worth declines. When interest rates on government  paper are high, it is attractive to buy
Treasury  bills. But high interest rates reflect the risk of devaluation  and default and reduce net
worth. The dynamic  process  is such  that interest  rates which are too high may lead to default. At
some point, interest rates become so high (and the effects on government  net worth so negative)
that the short run gains from buying foreign  assets are offset by the risk of default. While large
amounts  of deficit financing  through short  term external  borrowing  can be a risky endeavor,  it is
still important  to develop a domestic Treasury  bill market since  this will help in the conduct of
monetary policies and also provide a liquid asset for the financial sector. Countries such as
Turkey,  Russia and Ukraine  are at one extreme:  they have shown  an excessive  reliance on short
term Treasury bills much of it financed by external funds. Estonia on the other hand, is
constrained  by the lack of a market in Treasury  bills.
The fiscal  authorities  can  also help  reduce vulnerability not  only by  maintaining  high
liquidity but also by  diversifying the  currency in which  external debt  is denominated  through
active debt management. Argentina follows such a strategy. External debt management however,
consists of more than managing the maturity structure of debt, the interest rate and the currency
denomination. Debt management includes avoiding clauses- such as bullet repayment clauses on
external debt which are effective at the discretion of the  lender- which  are unfavorable for the
country and allows  lenders to demand repayment (through a put option) when certain conditions
(unfavourable to the borrower) prevail. Good debt management includes efforts to reduce risk by
having  large sources of liquid funds available, or the use of floating interest rates  on  debt (in
order to reduce the attractiveness of short term debt paying very high interest rates).
Lastly, tax policies can be important destabilisers. For example, in Turkey, Treasury bills
benefit  from  preferential  tax  rates. In  Thailand banks  borrowing  and  lending  exclusively  in
foreign currency have received tax breaks (Bangkok International Banking Facility).
The old lesson that the package of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate targets need to be
consistent holds even more strongly in the presence of open capital accounts since governments
can be punished much faster and with greater severity in such a world. And governments  must
maintain a strong liquidity position. Liquidity is particularly important for emerging economies
because central banks are constrained in their ability to act as lender of last resort: people do not
just  run from banks, they run from the currency. Argentina, through its liquidity requirements  on
banks and its contingent credit facility is aiming precisely to increase liquidity in case of bank-
currency runs.
15Exchange  Rate, and  MonetaryPolicies
Currency runs and crises can occur no matter what the exchange rate regime. Following the
East  Asian crises,  fixed exchange rates and subsequent large  (and too late)  devaluations were
blamed. These exchange rate regimes were viewed to be an important element attracting capital
inflows to many countries (by allowing capital to be provided at lower risk and therefore lower
prices  so  that  quantities  demanded  are  commensurately  higher).  As  a  consequence,  many
countries have attempted to lower capital inflows by changing their exchange rate policy. It has
however, been argued that markets/ investors are irrational in not buying insurance under fixed
exchange rates (Stiglitz, 1999). The role of insurance markets is to provide insurance for precisely
these sorts of outcomes: the small probability of a large negative outcome. The absence of such
insurance markets may be viewed as a market failure  23 Recently, others have argued that in the
presence of implicit guarantees and fixed exchange rates it may be optimal for firms to not hedge
all  their foreign  exchange risks (Burnside, Eichenbaum  and Rebelo,  1999). Another  argument
says that the focus on the so called stability of exchange rates is misguided: countries with fixed
exchange rates  generally have their  currencies fixed against one major currency while the risk
against other  currencies fluctuates  along with the value of the  currency to which  it is pegged.
Most of the emerging markets that have suffered crises have had fixed exchange rates  (but this
may  be because a large number of emerging markets have such an exchange rate regime).  Yet
currency crises can also occur under flexible rates as the two crises in Turkey (1991 and 1994)
demonstrate (see Box 3). However, it may be that by increasing short term foreign exchange risks
under flexible exchange rates in markets where perfect markets (for hedging) may not exist, the
supply of capital will shift upwards and demand downwards, so that lower levels of lending and
borrowing are realized. If this is so, then the magnitude of the crisis when it hits, could be smaller
in floating rate regimes.
Countries such as Argentina have fared relatively well on their currency boards. Argentina
suffered from the Tequila effect in the wake of the Mexican crisis and in respon.se strengthened
its  financial  and  monetary  management.  But  the  recent  developments  in  Brazil  and  in
international  financial  markets  has  created  recessionary  pressures.  Under  its  currency  board,
Estonia  in Eastern Europe, has managed its economy well till now. The key to t]his  has been the
development  of  a  flexible  economy  which  Estonia  must  maintain  in view  of  the  rigidity  in
relative prices imposed by the currency board. Estonia  has not been exempt from expectations
23 Some  believe  that the close  nexus  between  corporations  and govermment  in East Asia led to such failures
(explaining  the lack of demand  for such services  and  therefore  the lack of such  markets  developing).
16that it might adjust its peg, but it has survived with some international help. Other countries (such
as Chile) have chosen exchange rate bands of various types.
A key issue is whether countries that are on the verge of financial crises (for example those
that  have  been  affected  by  some degree  of  contagion)  should  introduce  flexibility  in their
currencies,  or  more  generally,  when  is the  correct  time  to  float  (managed  or  otherwise)  or
introduce some exchange rate flexibility? The experience of Mexico, Brazil  and the East Asian
economies suggest that the correct time to devalue may not be when the economy is already being
hit by investor skittishness. In fact, there seems to be no correct time forlarge  devaluations. The
probability of recovering from large overvaluations smoothly seems to be small. 24 Therefore, the
argument for avoiding large real appreciations and keeping devaluations small, even if frequent,
or for having an adjustable exchange rate band is persuasive.
Should a country float its currency completely or raise interest rates to defend it when hit
by  contagion? Neither  policy  will be a  panacea and  its effects will depend  on  private  sector
expectations regarding economic recovery. Rising interest rates can have enormous consequences
for the corporate sector and the banking sector, particularly if the banking sector is weak and the
corporate sector is highly indebted as East Asia has shown.  And high interest rates may not serve
to defend the currency.25 Subsequent large devaluations (which have  invariably followed)  will
make these effects worse. If a country foregoes high interest rates, then the alternative may be an
immediate devaluation. Depending on the structure of indebtedness of the economy, the level of
reserves, and the characteristics of indebted firms, devaluations may have less negative effects on
firm performance and output. In countries where corporations with high levels of domestic debt
and  banks  are  relatively  well  hedged  against  foreign  currency  risks,  a  devaluation  before
undergoing a period of high interest rates (which would have lowered firm net worth economy-
wide and worsened banks'  portfolios) may have fewer negative effects than high interest rates. In
most developed nations, shocks to the financial sector which pose systemic risk have been dealt
with  by  providing  liquidity  to  financial  institutions  and thereby  maintaining  production  and
financial intermediation.  By reducing the real effects on the economy, policymakers may be able
to help reverse capital outflows or shorten the period of outflows.
Exchange  rate/  interest  rate  policies  can  have  different  distributional  impacts  which
governments  will also  need  to consider.  An increase  in  interest rates  aimed  at  defending  the
24 Goldfahn  and  Valdes  (1998)  show that  the probability  of recovering  smoothly  from large  overvaluations
(over 25%)  is only  about 4%.
25 Kraay  (1998).
17currency may have disproportionate effects on medium scale enterprises: very small firms may
not have  relations  with the  banking sector and the top few firms will more  likely be able to
maintain international sources of funding or maintain access to credit from domestic institutions
at preferred rates.  But an exchange rate devaluation may also increase the prices of goods (such
as imported food) that the poor consume. The urban poor may be more likely to suffer.
Sterilization
Many countries such as Mexico, Chile and Korea have tried to sterilize capital inflows in
order to dampen the effects on their economy. Sterilization may entail substantial (quasi-fiscal)
costs for governments. The empirical evidence indicates that sterilization has led to accumulation
of reserves but that despite sterilization, exchange rates still tended to appreciate, short term paper
became  more  attractive  as short  term  interest rates  rose,  and that  higher  interest  rates  have
dampened investment demand  (Reinhart and Reinhart, 1997). More recent evidence from fifteen
emerging economies around the world indicates that increased sterilisation results in an increase
in the aggregate volume of capital flows and also a shift in the relative importance of short term
capital to FDI (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999)
Dollarisation
In many emerging economies, the implementation of monetary and exchange rate policy is
complicated  by  the  dollarisation  of  the  economy.  Residents  are  permitted  to  hold  foreign
exchange deposits,  and many transactions are conducted in foreign currency.  While  allowing
dollar  denominated  deposits  can  improve  financial  intermediation,  the  use  of  dollars  in  an
economy alongside the domestic currency also introduces complexities in monetary management.
Demand for the domestic currency is likely to be much more volatile (and related to transactions
and income in a much more complicated manner) and it may be difficult to know what monetary
aggregates  are  relevant  in  determing  inflation. 26 Further,  foreign  exchange  risks  for  banks
increase substantially. Financial sector regulation needs to recognize the greater risks.
Financial Sector Policies
Vast financial reallocations in the recent crises have highlighted the weakness of regulatory
policies  in  both developed  countries  and  emerging markets.  This  section  focuses  on  what
emerging markets may do to ensure risk bearing commensurate with risk management ability in
26 The  two currencies  serve essentially  the same  purpose  so the public  may  shift between  them for reasons
which are not easily  identifiable.  In Peru for example,  it was found  that broad  money aggregates  were
the relevant aggregate  in predicting  inflation.
18their financial sectors. Some general observations can be made: First, financial sector distress can
quickly  be  transformed  into  a  currency  crisis.  Second,  high  financial  sector  profits  do  not
necessarily indicate a healthy, stable or buoyant financial sector.7 Third, financial institutions are
both a source of risk to, and are affected by risks from the rest of the economy. Fourth, overly
restrictive  financial  sector  policies,  or the  wrong  kind  of restrictions,  when  imposed  on  the
financial sector will prevent  it from doing its job of reallocating risks  and intermediating funds
well.
When the recent currency crises erupted, it was argued that restrictions on the activities of
banks  were necessary since  these are the entities which  benefit from the  majority  of implicit
government  guarantees  through  deposit  insurance (explicit  or  implicit).  Most  countries  have
found that by targeting banking activities or only balance sheet activities of banks, risk taking
activities are moved either off balance sheet, to subsidiaries, or to nonbank institutions including
corporations,  (and  credit  risk  replaces  currency  risk).  Even  nonbank  corporations  can  pose
systemic risks and/or become too large too fail (for example, in response to export shocks).  In
many smaller countries activities of these large corporations may also be viewed as guaranteed
(and thus subject to moral hazard problems) in the sense that governments will take actions to
protect them.  As another  example,  if domestic banks  are prevented from  borrowing  offshore,
firms could borrow offshore and deposit these funds with banks which, with borrowing restricted,
might  offer  good  interest  rates.  Banks would  onlend  these  funds  to  other  customers.  If  the
corporations  hedged  their exposure by  making foreign  currency deposits in banks then  banks
would end up with the same short term exposure as when there were no restrictions. In the end
banks would bear the risk, and foreigners would continue to lend at favorable rates because banks
are  guaranteed.  (Eichengreen,  1999). These problems  suggest that  a  there  is  no  single  clean
instrument which will help manage risk for countries but rather a package of instruments needs to
be found for each country.
This being said, in most emerging markets, banks are the most important players  in the
financial system and by virtue of their dominance as well as their particular characteristics, banks
have also been the most important players  in the recent  financial crisis.  Therefore, this  section
will focus mostly on banks. For the purposes of this paper the various policies may be grouped
under two themes: (a) moderating the pace and growth of the financial sector and controlling the
level  and  composition  of  capital flows;  (b)  improving risk  management  (c)  supervision  and
27 In fact, work  done for the EBRD's  transition  report indicates  that  in many Eastern  European  countries
high bank profitability  has been  associated  with  market  power  rather  than efficiency  gains.  There  have
also  been instances  of gambling  behaviour.
19regulation  during economic  downturns or potential downturns. There are many  other policies
which might be implemented to strengthen emerging market financial sectors but these will not
be covered here. 28
Restrictions on credit growth, and composition offlows
Recent  experience  suggests that  credit  growth  should  closely follow  output  growt:h in
economies with mature financial markets. In developing economies with a low degree of financial
depth, it can safely be between 1.5 and 2 times output growth but at higher rates it has been found
to be difficult to maintain the quality of banks' portfolios (Claessens, 1998). Credit growth can be
limited  by  imposing  high  marginal  reserve  requirements  on  deposits.  In Chile  for  exarnple,
demand  deposits  are  subject  to  a  9%  reserve  requirement  but  there  is  a  marginal  reserve
requirement of maintaining  100% in central bank paper for all  deposits that exceed 2.5  times
capital and reserves.29
Maturity requirements  (limiting maturity mismatches between assets and  :liabilities) may
be imposed on all financial institutions where, due to market or institutional failures, good risk
management will not be sufficient.Regulatory authorities may limit the leverage of those to whom
banks  lend. Korea has now imposed such a constraint. The experience of Malaysia shows that
tight regulation of banks-requiring  them to look at the foreign currency exposure of fimis to
which they lend can put a damper on foreign borrowing. 30
Managing Risk
Capital Adequacy and Incentives 31
Requiring  banks to  have high capital adequacy is one of the most obvious  ways to affect
incentives since having  own capital at risk tends to reduce risky behaviour. It has been argued
that countries  subject to volatility (emerging economies) should adopt higher capital adequacy
standards  in order to provide  a buffer  for banks  which would reduce vulnerability.  There  are
many drawbacks to relying primarily on this instrument. First it is difficult to measure capital and
to  measure  the  quality  of  capital  particularly  in  emerging  markets  where  the  quality  of
information is poor. Second, this requirement may not always work. The experience of Malaeysia
28  See Stiglitz  (1999)  for a full discussion.
29  In many countries  reserve  requirements  were abolished  as implementation  of monetary  policy  became
more  sophisticated.
30 Malaysia's  downturn  has hit mostly  the inflated  property  sector  and the construction  sector.
31 This  topic is not covered  here in detail but only  in relation  to its effectiveness  in guarding  banks against
excessive  volatility.
20in this regard is illuminating. Malaysia has had a two tiered financial system since 1994. Banks in
tier one had double the capital requirements of those in the second tier and these banks in turn
were  allowed  to  offer  a  much  wider  range  of products. The  large  minimum  paid  in  capital
requirements led to several shareholders of tier one banking institutions borrowing short term in
order to enhance their capital base. These banks then had to lend aggressively in order to generate
sufficiently high returns to service their debt obligations. The central bank of Malaysia has since
announced  that  increases  in  bank  capital  by  bank  holding  companies  and  other  controlling
shareholders should be funded by non-debt sources. It has been argued (Fernandez and Guidotti,
1996) that where bank asset quality (and therefore bank capital) cannot be measured well, reserve
requirements may be a substitute for capital requirements.
A general lesson that also emerges is that there is a need to differentiate between  systemic
distress  in the financial sector and isolated distress. Isolated distress does not generally lead to
currency crises, only systemic ones. The key objective of financial and macro policy should be to
limit negative effects on output and employment since this will generally  be the most effective
way to regain access to international markets. In this regard, excessively stringent application of
capital  adequacy  requirements  during  downturns  or periods  of  systemic  distress  may  work
counter to the objective of maintaining output stability.
Imposing liquidity requirements for banks will reduce chances of a liquidity crisis.  They
can be implemented in a variety of ways. For example a certain percentage of assets (based on
either total liabilities or short term liabilities) may be required to be held in liquid form. Some
countries allow these assets to be held in assets with low credit or market risk (such as United
States Treasury bills). The banks' holdings of liquid assets were crucial in enabling the Argentine
banking  system to  survive  a  20%  deposit  outflow  in the  Tequila  crisis  of  1994-95 without
abandoning the  currency board. Now  liquidity ratios  in Argentina  amount  to  around  30% of
deposits (some held  offshore) and have helped banks survive through the unfavorable  market
conditions of 1997-1999. Many countries allow foreign exchange deposits in their banks.  These
deposits can increase  foreign currency (and liquidity) risk for banks; there  is an argument  for
32 In other  words,  reserve  requirements  maintain  a prudential  role in addition  to being a monetary  policy
instrument.  They show  that  banks' marginal  cost  of funds  raised with  deposits  when  reserve
requirements  are low, is lower  than  the marginal  cost  of capital.  Therefore,  the desired  capital
adequacy  ratio by banks is lower.  For high  reserve  requirements,  desired  capital  asset ratios are
higher.  Where  there are strong  informational  asymmetries,  and less  than ideal accounting  standards,
banks  may  report capital  asset ratios  which  may not reflect  its true state.  The use of the reserve
requirement  can then enforce  the capital  adequacy  ratio that  the authorities  want. The authors also
show  that in such  a system  (ceteris  paribus)  the equilibrium  will be associated  with a lower volume  of
credit and  higher interest  rates.
21imposing  reserve  requirements  on these  deposits as well.  High  liquidity ratios  however  raise
banking costs.
Government treasury bills in countries where the fiscal and overall macroeconomic situation
is  not sustainable,  or  is frequently  subject to  shocks  (emerging economies)  such as those  in
Turkey and Ukraine should be considered "risky"  assets and their acquisition monitored.  If, as
has frequently been suggested, these countries just  implement the Basle standard[s  they will use
0% risk weights for government bills/bonds and they will underprovision for the substantial risks
in their portfolio arising from their holdings of government paper.
The role of foreign banks has been subject to some discussion. Some believe that the entry of
foreign  banks can increase the efficiency of the banking sector and  increase  access to  foreign
funds.  Estonia  has  looked  to  the  entry of  foreign banks  to  help  stabilize  its  banking  sector.
Argentina,  another  country  with  a  currency  board  has  looked  to  foreign  entry  and  has
significantly restructured its banking sector (since the Tequila crisis).  Foreign banks may be able
to mitigate the effects of a credit crunch. This will only work if they can distinguish good credit
from  bad.  But  country  experience  suggests  that  even  foreign  banks  may  provide  f.unds
procyclically. Further, financial institutions from developing countries may suffer through links
with countries with unstable macroeconomic conditions. Entry of entities from financially well
developed and stable economies might increase stability. But foreign funding of domestic banks
through  deposits and  deposit  like  instruments-  which  are very  liquid (eg  Estonian /Ukranian
banks  in Russia)  can be very volatile  if the foreign source is an emerging market.  Banks may
need  additional reserves. Even lending to nonbanks and corporations  in countries with unstable
macroeconomic conditions  may pose systemic risks for the host (emerging) economy.
Volatility  in capital flows can increase volatility in stock markets. The asset bubble crash in
Asia meant that recovery in Asia took longer while the absence of such a crash in Mexico may
have  led to faster recovery.  Since firms were highly leveraged, a fall in asset prices had  large
effects on net worth. As credit constrained firms tried to increase liquidity by selling assets, asset
prices fell further. Credit constraints can interact with business cycle fluctuations to accentuate
declines  in economic activity (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1995). These experiences suggest that there
may be value in imposing restrictions  on the granting of margin loans particularly  when capital
markets  are open33 and equity markets  are thin, and on restrictions  on  lending to the property
sector: an area susceptible to bubbles. Thailand had restrictions on lending to the property sector
33  Opening  capital  markets  has the effect  of making  stock  markets  more  volatile  (Levine,  1998).
22which it removed in 1996. There may also be a case for restrictions on asset base diversification/
concentration by sector.
Policiesfor  the Corporate Sector
Corporate accounts were the least transparent in the countries which were the worst affected
by the capital outflows in East Asia,. Transparency in public and private accounts and processes
may  reduce  rents  resulting  from  asymmetric  information  and  therefore  rent  seeking  and
speculative attacks. But  in order for transparency and  information provision to  be effective,  it
needs  to  be  comprehensive  or  else risk  increasing activities  will  migrate  *to less  transparent
sectors. Timely dissemination of information may limit contagion by helping creditors distinguish
between good and bad credit and solvent and insolvent governments (this will affect the value of
the guarantee  enjoyed by the  banks). But the  information has to  be of good  quality. For this
reason,  adopting  international  accounting standards  (rather than  standards  unique  to  any one
country), and enforcing disclosure of information would be recommended.
Much of banking distress is linked to corporate distress. Lack of good workout practices and
clear  bankruptcy procedures may  make  investors more  volatile  (Caprio and  Honohan,  1999).
Some say the lack of clear bankruptcy laws and workout mechanisms added to the withdrawal of
credit in East Asia and elsewhere since foreign lenders feared they would have little recourse to
collect on bad loans. Borrower incentives are also affected by the legal environment. Therefore, a
legal system is well equipped to deal with bankruptcy and to enforce contracts  may improve a
country's  creditworthiness  relative  to  others  and  limit  herding  behaviour  and  volatility  (for
example).
Another option aimed at reducing volatility is to reduce the build-up of short-term external
debt  might  be  to  limit  the  tax  deductibility  of  interest  payments  on  such debt  (Stiglitz  and
Bhattacharya,  1997).  Finally,  the  composition  of  debt  may  be  affected  by  policy.  Good
macroeconomic  and structural policies will be more  likely to attract the better  kind  of capital
flows, but easing administrative restrictions on FDI will also help.
Creditor Countries
Policies  in  developed  countries'  financial  markets  have  strong  effects  on  emerging
economies.  An  example  is  a  provision  of the  1998 Basle  Accords  which  has  the  effect  of
distorting  creditors'  incentives and  increasing emerging market risk:  under  these  Accords  for
bank supervision, short term bank credit to non-OECD banks carries a 20% risk weighting while
23long  term  credit  (over  one  year)  carries  a  100% risk  weight.  Similarly  claims  on  financial
institutions carry a 20% risk weight while claims on non-financial institutions carry a  100% risk
weight  for emerging markets, thus encouraging banks to  lend to less regulated entities  such as
hedge funds. Lender country lapse and subsequent tightening of regulations  and supervision of
their  banks  can  create  or exacerbate  vulnerabilities  in  emerging  markets.  For  example,  lax
regulation of Japanese banks allowed large amounts of lending to East Asia the riskiness of which
was not properly accounted for by banks in the pricing of their loans. Later when the Japanese
authorities took actions to strengthen banks' balance sheets, this led to a decline in the availability
of credit on favorable terms for East Asian emerging markets. As another example, regulations on
the quality of the assets held by institutional investors may enhance dumping of emerging market
assets in bad periods.
Expectations  of  bailouts  by  the  international  community  (or  a  subset  thereof)  can  have
significant  effects on financial flows to emerging economies. Bail-outs were first  viewed as a
mechanism which  would limit the  spread of financial crises  by bolstering  investor confidence
though they could increase moral hazard for lenders. More recently, the view has been expressed
that  large  bailouts  due  to  their  high  costs  for  the  international  community  may  reduce
expectations  of  a  similar  bailout  for  another  country and  therefore  increase  the  chance  of a
speculative attack on that country. Bail-ins of private creditors (forced rescheduling) will ensure
that  creditors take  some losses for risky  loans they  have  made. But  forcing a  bail-in  in one
country may lead to withdrawal of credit from other emerging markets and also, slower growth of
such credit in the future. While the first consequence could be large and negative (attempts to bail
in creditors to Ukraine has only been partially  successful and for Russia, unsuccessful to date),
particularly in a situation of global pessimism, the second may be desirable over the longer term.
Negative output effects associated with financial withdrawal can be exacerbated by prolonged
bargaining  between creditor and debtor countries which precedes the reorganization  of claims.
Creditors know that not everyone will get paid and this makes resolution of claims more difficult.
There are  options such as "standstills"  for all creditors at times of crisis, contingent credit  lines
from  international  lenders, and  special  bankruptcy  laws which,  if  implemented  under  severe
macroeconomic  shocks, 34 could  limit  the  impact  on  output  by  (a)limiting  outflows  and
(b)allowing  for  quick  resumption  of  production.  However  if  policies  at  the  national  or
supranational  level were such that some of these measures (such as a super bankruptcy law or
34 These laws  would  be intended  to facilitate  resolution  of claims  in crisis  situations.  By thus shortening  the
period during  which  reorganization!  restructuring  takes  place, and  by including  provisions  more in
presumption  of the debtor and  the continuation  of production,  the decline  in output  may be
diminished.
24standstills) would be adopted, there would probably be ex ante effects on the price and volume of
capital  flows. In  short,  their  volume  may  fall  and  the  price  may  increase.  Both  actions  are
desirable over the medium term to the extent that the allocation and pricing of credit will more
closely approximate the true risks of lending to emerging markets.
Conclusion: General Lessons Revisited
The policies which might be used by emerging markets to improve risk management with
open and liberalized financial markets may be summarized under four broad headings: Debt
management and controls on capital flows, financial and corporate sector policies to manage risk,
sound macroeconomic policies, and transparency and the provision of information.
Debt Management and Controls on Capital Flows
A key lesson is that countries need to manage the growth of external indebtedness and its
maturity,  level and currency composition. Large amounts of short term debt should be avoided
and bunching  of debt repayments  should be avoided. Where  short term  debt  is already  large,
reserves relative to liquid liabilities will need to be strengthened (the critical ratio seems to be 1).
A  manageable  debt  stock can swiftly become an unsustainable one. If  countries opt for  large
levels of short term debt, they need to factor in the  costs of maintaining  high levels  of liquid
reserves. Fiscal discipline is an important element of sustainable debt management and liquidity
management.  But  when  private  sector borrowers are  unable to  hedge risks  or  manage risks,
policies promoting good debt management will be needed. Countries may  need to tax  external
capital in order to smooth out real effects on the capital importing country (including exit taxes)
and to encourage flows of capital which are less volatile. (Particularly  if the country  faces an
upward  sloping supply of capital, as usually  is the  case, there  is an argument  for taxation  of
foreign capital). Large volatility in capital flows and therefore in output may lead to net welfare
being lower on  average than would otherwise be the case. Evidence to date indicates that FDI
flows are less volatile  than  other types of flows but countries need to factor  in remittances  in
future years.
Managing Financial Sector Risk.
Full  liberalisation of the financial sector leads to a wider set of opportunities for  banks.
Liberalisation of the financial sector and of capital flows should keep pace with the development
of institutional mechanisms designed to ensure efficient allocation of resources and to minimize
divergences between private and social costs. One way to effectively limit the rate at which new
risks  emerge and  multiply  (so as to  be more  consistent with  the  supervisory capacity  of the
25country) is to  limit the growth of the financial sector. It will not only  lower  the chance  of a
financial crisis but also  enable a faster turn  around in case a  financial crisis occurs. Very  fast
financial  sector growth ending  in highly leveraged firms (when equity  and  bond  financing  is
underdeveloped) makes firms very vulnerable to changes in interest rates. The decline in firm net
worth is larger for heavily leveraged firms when interest rates rise. In emerging markets  where
risk  management  capacities  are  under-developed  or  risk  hedging  opportunities  are  limited,
maturity  and  liquidity  requirements  for  financial  institutions  are  recommended.  Country
experience has shown that taxing/restricting activities of banks only leads to movement of risky
activities to non-banks. Other policies, the precise nature of which would depend on the structure
of the economy, (for example, whether it is corporations or non bank financial institutions which
are borrowing short-term) may be needed. Bank lending which is based on the use of securil:ies as
collateral when stock markets are thin (these assets become more important the less developed is
the  bankruptcy  law)  can  also  aggravate  downturns  in  economic  activity  and  supervisory
authorities  may  need  to restrict  these activities.  Supervisors may  also need  tc, consider some
restrictions on bank investment in assets such as real estate which are subject to bubbles.
Other Macroeconomic Policies.
An important  message  is that  the exchange rate regime  matters  only to the  extent  that
policymakers should avoid large real appreciations. Monetary policy should be consistent  with
fiscal policy and with the countries growth objectives. Initial policy responses to tighter markets
matter.  In  periods  of  capital  flow  reversal  policymakers  need  to  make  difficult  decisions
regarding the relative adjustment through prices versus outputs. In times of crisis the first priority
should  be  to  maintain  production,  and  to  preserve  real  capital  (organizational,  social,
informational,  human  and  physical).  Policies  which  are  dictated  by  these  priorities  may  be
different from country to country and there is no good recipe for success. Sometimes there  is little
choice. East Asia attempted to maintain the exchange rate, but ended up with large devaluations
and  large  output losses.  The question is, would  an initial devaluation  have  led to less  severe
output declines and when do interest rate hikes work? Estonia has adjusted to declining  capital
inflows by maintaining flexibility in internal markets (prices and output) and has also experlienced
both deflation and a slowdown in output growth. But it has avoided a currency crisis by allowing
European investors to "solve" its banking crisis. In 1998, the number of banks in Estonia dropped
from  11  to  five  and  most  banks  were  bought  by  European  partners.  One  mLight  argue  that
Estonia's  opportunities are not available for all countries, that the "guarantee" on policy through
Estonia's  imminent accession to the EU plays an important role. But countries need to realise that
if they wish to maintain their exchange rate pegs then they must adjust through other means.
26Information and Transparency.
Emerging markets  are less likely to  have good quality  information  and less  transparent
economies  than  those  in  developed  countries.  Access  on  a  timely  basis  to  good  quality
information  will  help  investors  to  distinguish  good  risks  from  bad  and  could  limit  herding
behaviour.  It  may  also  reduce  inflows  ex ante  to  economies  whose vulnerabilities  are  more
exposed, but this is also desirable in view of the fact that reversals in these cases are more likely.
But it is still important to have richfrtiends....
No  matter how  sophisticated a  country's  risk  management systems,  and  how  good  its
policies are on average, relative rates of returns on assets and expectations change continuously
across  countries. Developed countries themselves may  exacerbate these  changes through their
financial  as well  as macroeconomic policies.  And subjective factors are important  in effecting
real changes. In a world where financial markets are becoming increasingly global, and where
transactions costs have fallen due to technological improvements, capital will continuously move
in  and  out  of countries.  Countries  may  experience real  output  costs  as  a  result.  But  recent
experiences  have  shown that  having rich neighbors who are  willing to bail  you  out (like the
Mexicans did) reduces these costs. With financial help (a great deal came from the United  States
government) Mexico retired its tesobonos at full value and regained market access within months.
Mexico  received  much  more cash  than  did Asia  at the  time  of the  liquidity crunch:  though
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand together received about US$118 billion, about the same amount in
terms of GDP as Mexico at US$ 40 billion, a lot of the money was reserved as contingent second
line of defense funds from individual governments with little chance of early disbursement. By
the end of the third quarter of 1998 only US$ 35 billion was disbursed.
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